THE BATTLE OF DIEN BIEN PHU

[Phil Perry]

This is for Storchy Neil. . . .

 

Operation Castor - The Battle of Dien Bien Phu, Part One

 

 

The End of French Colonial Influence in Indo-China 1954

 

The French involvement in Indo-China dates back to the 17th Century when a Jesuit missionary crusade arrived in the region to save souls, but more importantly to open a trading hub for France. French influence spread throughout the region by the French army backing local warlords, much as did the British in India. The Nguyễn dynasty increasingly saw French rule as a threat and attempted to unify the country, but France tightened its grip with a successful attack on Da Nang by French Admiral Charles Rigault de Genouilly, under the orders of Napoleon III. Expansion caused continual rebellion and conflict, which the French ruthlessly crushed. The culmination was the Franco-Siamese War of 1893. In 1893 the French authorities in Indochina used border disputes, followed by the Paknam naval incident, to provoke a crisis. French gunboats appeared at Bangkok, and demanded the cession of Lao territories east of the Mekong River.

 

Following the fall of France in WW2, the French colonies remained under Vichy control, however, Thailand realising that the French were weakened, initiated the Thai/French war of 1940/41 to recapture lost territory. The war ended with the intervention of Japan, who went on to demand access to Tonkin. Eventually the Japanese brought Indo-China under the Greater East Asia Co- Prosperity Sphere. After WW2 the French attempted to reinstate authority of Indo-China, but the situation was extremely complex. The Americans made it clear that they would not support the French in their attempt to regain former colonies. During WW2 the Americans supported the Viet Minh, a coalition of Communist and Vietnamese nationalists led by Hồ Chí Minh, founder of the Indochinese Communist Party in their fight against the Japanese. In 1945 Hồ Chí Minh declared independence for the democratic republic of Vietnam. A force of British and Free French soldiers, along with captured Japanese troops, restored French control. Bitter fighting ensued in the First Indochina War. In 1950 Ho again declared an independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which was recognised by the fellow Communist governments of China and the Soviet Union.

 

While the British under an Attlee socialist government were almost relieved to abandon the trappings of a colonial power, the French seemed to take a form of solace from their colonies and still recognised them as a way of defining their country. The British turned away from their colonial past. The French were desperate to hang onto theirs. While Britain disbanded her finest military units, the French released their conscript army and recruited from the finest displaced soldiers floating throughout a fragmented and displaced Europe. The Légion Étrangère recruited Poles, former SS men and disparate, ex-serving British military personnel, disillusioned by the promised socialist utopia that turned out to be as grey, depressing and uninspiring as the Blitz.

 

By 1953 the French forces were embroiled in a gruelling war. The French premier René Mayer appointed Henri Navarre to take command of French Union forces in Indochina. Navarre was shocked at the state of military preparedness. Operations were merely conducted in reaction to enemy moves or actions. A lassiez faire attitude permeated the command structure and staff officers were more concerned with getting out of Vietnam with their reputations tarnished, but intact. Navarre turned to his main planning officer, Colonel Louis Berteil who outlined a scheme of manoeuvre that became known as the “Hedgehog” concept. The French army would establish a fortified airhead using airborne troops to interdict the enemy’s rear areas and cut the flow of supplies in Laos. The hedgehog concept had been proven in the Battle of Nà Sản where a fortified camp supplied solely by air had repeatedly beaten back General Giáp’s forces. The plan was to lure Giáp into committing the bulk of his forces, where French armour and air power could destroy them.

 

In June, Major General René Cogny, the commander of the Tonkin Delta, proposed Điện Biên Phủ, which had an old airstrip built by the Japanese during World War II, as a "mooring point". In a misunderstanding, Cogny envisaged a lightly defended point from which to launch raids; however, Navarre believed that he intended a heavily fortified base capable of withstanding a siege. Navarre selected Điện Biên Phủ for the location of Berteil's "hedgehog" operation. When presented with the plan, every major subordinate officer protested: Colonel Jean-Louis Nicot who commanded the French Air transport fleet, was concerned about the vulnerability of the airstrips. Cogny, and generals Jean Gilles and Jean Dechaux, the ground and air commanders for the initial airborne assault on Điện Biên Phủ, also voiced their concerns. Cogny pointed out, that "we are running the risk of a new Nà Sản under worse conditions". While the positions at Nà Sản were on fortified hills, Điện Biên Phủ was in a river valley surrounded by hills. Navarre rejected the criticisms of his proposal and concluded a November 17 conference by declaring that the operation would begin three days later, on 20 November 1953.

 

 

The air and Viet Minh ground corridors to Dien Bien Phu

 

At 1035L on 20th November 1953, the French began to drop by parachute and swiftly destroyed the Viet Minh defenders based around Điện Biên Phủ. The French flew in 9,000 troops over three days, including combat engineers and bulldozers. By the end of November six parachute battalions were in position and the French dug in to consolidate their gains. Giáp had expected a French attack, but was unsure where it would occur. On 24 November, Giáp ordered the 148th Infantry Regiment and the 316th Division to attack Lai Chau, while the 308th, 312th, and 351st divisions would assault Điện Biên Phủ. Giáp was hoping that the French would abandon Lai Chau Province and fight a pitched battle at Điện Biên Phủ. In December the French under the command of Christian de Castries turned their anchorage point into a fortress. Seven satellite positions were set up, allegedly named after the colonel’s mistresses with the headquarters centrally located. Huguette was to the west, Claudine to the south, and Dominique to the northeast. The other positions were Anne-Marie to the northwest, Beatrice to the northeast, Gabrielle to the north, and Isabelle 3.7 miles to the south, covering the reserve airstrip.

 

With the manoeuvre of Vietnamese 316th Division into Lai Chau Province, Major General René Cogny ordered the evacuation of the garrison and its redeployment to Điện Biên Phủ, just as Giáp had hoped. En-route the garrison was annihilated by Giáp’s forces and of the 2,100 men who left Lai Chau, 185 made it to Điện Biên Phủ, arriving on 2nd December. Far from fighting a mobile battle of Manoeuvre which would have suited de Castries as a cavalryman, the battle would be one of static defence more akin to Verdun. The French weren’t fighting the last war, they were fighting the one prior to that.

 

The French had inserted 16,000 troops into a monsoon affected valley that was surrounded by unsecured hills. The garrison included most of France’s elite troops, artillery, Chaffee light tanks and locally recruited Vietnamese infantry. The Viet Minh had moved 50,000 regular troops into the hills surrounding the valley, totalling five divisions including the 351st Heavy Division, which was made up entirely of heavy artillery. The artillery and antiaircraft guns, which outnumbered the French batteries by about four to one, were moved into positions overlooking the valley. The French came under direct and sporadic Viet Minh artillery fire for the first time on 31 January 1954, and patrols encountered the Viet Minh in all directions. The French were surrounded and now the only way in or out was by air.

 

 

The Strongpoints and the airstrips

 

The French airborne troops sent out fighting patrols to try and ascertain the numbers of the Viet Minh forces, but they were masters of quick engagement before disappearing into the jungle. These often futile patrols were a diversion from the tedium of digging the defences, but it proved to the French that Giáp’s soldiers were the masters of the terrain. It must have been profoundly depressing to look at the jungle clad hills around the garrison and wonder what they hid.

 

H/T BP.

 

 

[Yenn]

And then the Yanks came to achieve the same objective. They never learn.

 

 

[Old Koreelah]

Ho Chi Minh worked in New York for a time and was a great admirer of the USA. After being a useful ally to the Americans during WWII, he based the wording of Vietnam's Declaration of Independence on the document framed by America's founding fathers. Instead of helping Vietnam get free of its colonial masters, the Americans helped the French to slaughter the locals. Decades of misery for millions could have been averted.

 

 

[Phil Perry]

Ho Chi Minh worked in New York for a time and was a great admirer of the USA. After being a useful ally to the Americans during WWII, he based the wording of Vietnam's Declaration of Independence on the document framed by America's founding fathers. Instead of helping Vietnam get free of its colonial masters, the Americans helped the French to slaughter the locals. Decades of misery for millions could have been averted.

Indeed OK. . . . the yanks have a habit of doing this sort of thing and never seem to learn anything along the way. . .

 

 

[storchy neil]

USA fought in nam on two frounts home and nam

 

aust in nam fought on two frounts home and nam

 

on return from nam the parisites in aust condemned me calling me a baby killer worn that hurt for fifty years suck it up baby were you there neil

 

 

[Bruce]

Gosh Neil I'm sorry you were persecuted back in Australia for being in the Vietnam war. My number was in the lottery for conscription but I never got called up.

 

In later years I was against the war, but I never personally heard anybody being nasty to returned men and I would never have tolerated it.

 

The worst injustice known to me at the time was how some RSL branches were closed to Vietnam returnees. I still find that disgusting, although they have long ago fixed it.

 

 

[Phil Perry]

USA fought in nam on two frounts home and namaust in nam fought on two frounts home and nam

 

on return from nam the parisites in aust condemned me calling me a baby killer worn that hurt for fifty years suck it up baby were you there neil

Comiserations Neil, One of my Rellies in Michigan was spat upon, wearing his uniform whilst at an airport when returning from Gulf War 1.

 

This must be a painful and bewildering experience. Makes you wonder if the 'Spitters' saved any for the Pollies who were complicit.

 

 

[Phil Perry]

This is for Storchy Neil as well, to complete the story. . . . .and anyone else who may have been involved in Vietnam later on. . .

 

Operation Castor - The Battle of Dien Bien Phu, Part Two

 

 

The Bitter End

 

The Viet Minh attacks started on 13th March 1954 with a fierce artillery bombardment on outpost Beatrice. A shell hit the command HQ killing Major Paul Pegot and his entire staff. Also killed was Colonel Jules Gaucher who was in command of the entire northern sector. Then the 312th Infantry Division began a direct assault using combat engineers to eliminate the defences and French opposition was wiped out in Beatrice shortly after midnight. Over 500 Legionnaires were killed for 600 Viet Minh killed and 1,200 wounded. The French attempted a counter attack to recapture the strongpoint but it was beaten back by artillery. What came as a profound shock to the French was that the Viet Minh artillery used direct fire instead of indirect fire that required experienced forward observers and a complex signals network. This was asymmetric warfare at its best. The Viet Minh artillery were well dug in with overhead protection and this had been carried out right under the noses of the French. On 15th March, the French artillery commander, Colonel Charles Piroth, distraught at his inability to bring counter battery fire on the well-camouflaged Viet Minh batteries, went into his dugout and committed suicide with a hand grenade. He was buried in secret to prevent loss of morale among the French troops.

 

By this time, the airstrips were interdicted by artillery fire and the only method of resupply was by parachute. On the night of the 15th March, the Viet Minh attacked Gabrielle, commencing at 1700L with a heavy artillery barrage. An artillery round severely wounded the battalion commander and killed most of his staff. De Castries ordered a counter attack by the 5th Vietnamese Parachute Battalion, but these troops were exhausted as they had jumped in the previous day. Although some made it to Gabrielle, they were mauled by artillery and the strongpoint was abandoned. The French had now lost two strongpoints, the airstrips were interdicted by artillery fire and resupply was difficult if not impossible. The French forces in Điện Biên Phủ were doomed.

 

 

Anne-Marie was defended by Tai troops who came from a Vietnamese ethnic minority. They had been sent subversive propaganda leaflets, telling them that this was not their fight and why should they die for the French? On the 17th March under the cover of fog, the majority of the Tais deserted, which depleted the defence of Anne-Marie to such an extent that the strongpoint had to be abandoned.

 

The 17th – 29th March saw a lull in the fighting when the French tried desperately to resupply the garrison and the Viet Minh tightened the noose. By now Isabelle with its 1,809 personnel was cut off from the rest of the northern strongpoints. The French leadership was in crisis as de Castries had isolated himself in his bunker. Major General René Cogny in Hanoi was aware of the situation and attempted to land at Điện Biên Phủ but was driven off by anti-aircraft fire. He contemplated parachuting in, but his staff officers were aghast and told him little could be achieved by the foolhardy gesture. It is alleged that on 24th March, Colonel Langlais and his paratroop commanders, fully armed, confronted de Castries in his bunker and relieved him of his command. They told him that he would retain the appearance of command, but Langlais would exercise it. On 27 March, the Hanoi air transport commander, Nicot, ordered that all supply deliveries were to be made from 6,600 feet or higher, however, losses were expected to remain heavy.

 

 

The next phase of the battle saw massed Viet Minh assaults against the central strongpoints, Eliane and Dominique. At 1900L on 30th March, the 312th Viet Minh Division captured Dominique 1 and 2, making Dominique 3 the final outpost protecting the French HQ. Only 105mm direct fire from howitzers halted the Viet Minh advance and forced them to retreat. The Viet Minh were more successful in their simultaneous attacks elsewhere. The 316th Division captured Eliane 1 from its Moroccan defenders, and half of Eliane 2 by midnight. On the other side of Điện Biên Phủ, the 308th attacked Huguette 7, and nearly succeeded in breaking through, but a French sergeant took charge of the defenders and sealed the breach. The battle raged over these central strongpoints over the next few days. Fighting continued over the next several nights. The Viet Minh repeatedly attacked Eliane 2, only to be beaten back. Repeated attempts to reinforce the French garrison by parachute drops were made, but had to be carried out by lone planes at irregular times to avoid excessive casualties from Viet Minh antiaircraft fire. Some reinforcements did arrive, but not enough to replace French casualties.

 

 

The Viet Minh had taken huge numbers of casualties to the French fighter bombers operating from the Hanoi airfields. These close support missions were flown in the face of murderous anti-aircraft fire, but they were sufficiently effective for Giáp to order reinforcements from Laos. He was facing his own crisis of lowered morale due to a lack of service support such as medical services. Some units refused to attack and prisoners taken by the French told them that officers would shoot men who refused to advance. The battle had by now degenerated into trench warfare fought by small units, led by NCOs.

 

 

The Viet Minh launched a massed assault on the night of the 1st May 1954. French artillery halted the first advance, but the Viet Minh detonated a mine dug under Eliane 2. On 7 May, Giáp ordered an all-out attack against the remaining French units with over 25,000 Viet Minh against fewer than 3,000 garrison troops. At 17:00L, de Castries radioed French headquarters in Hanoi and talked with Cogny.

 

De Castries: "The Viets are everywhere. The situation is very grave. The combat is confused and goes on all about. I feel the end is approaching, but we will fight to the finish."

 

Cogny replied: "Of course you will fight to the end. It is out of the question to run up the white flag after your heroic resistance."

 

By nightfall all of the central French positions had been captured. The last radio message to Hanoi stated that Viet Minh troops were outside of the command bunker. The radio operator’s last transmission was:

 

"The enemy has overrun us. We are blowing up everything. Vive la France!"

 

On 8th may, the Viet Minh took 11,721 prisoners of whom 4,436 were wounded. They were forced marched nearly 400 miles to prison camps, many of them dying of exhaustion and disease on the way. The French defeat led to the Geneva Conference which resulted in Vietnam being split into the Communist ruled north and the southern French- supported state of Vietnam. This state of affairs led to US intervention and the Vietnam War, which would involve over 500,000 US troops. It was the beginning of the end of not just French but other nations’ colonial rule. The Viet Minh success sparked other independence movements, especially in Africa.

 

The French had drawn the wrong conclusions from the initial success of the Hedgehog concept of operations. They squandered their advantage of swift deployment of forces by air and their potentially overwhelming advantage of air support. Instead they elected to fight a static war of attrition, in a poor defensive position, against a numerically superior enemy. Instead of drawing the Viet Minh into a battle of their choosing, the opposite happened. It was bound to end in failure.

 

BP.

 

Dedicated to Colonel V T, my Commander Med in Afghanistan, 2008. This is to thank him for his kindness and compassion, following the deaths of my parents whilst I was on Op HERRICK. I hope that I have been as objective and dispassionate to his country’s military history as he was to mine. How I miss our vibrant discussions on the Napoleonic Wars, and bow to his knowledge of the Grande Armée. But he never really understood the significance of Master and Commander….

 

 

[Bruce]

Thanks Phil, I remember hearing the news on the radio when I was a kid, but that is the first account I have read of what happened.

 

The stupidity of the French on many levels is astounding, matched fairly well by the stupidity of our leaders today in importing thousands of moslems and then being surprised at the result.

 

 

[storchy neil]

the stupidity of our leaders today in importing thousands of moslems and then being surprised at the result.

 

in my opinion brain dead garbage politicians and the so called do gooders who bring the enemy to our shores give em shelter food money should be made to pay

 

they are gutless garbage no respect for the soldiers

 

like the so called Vietnam victims who arrived here by boat loads how many were the peasants bloody none needed 5 grand to get on the boat then go back on holidays and made Cabramatta little siagon

 

now moslems let in same shit as they did not learn from Whitlam and co rudd Gillard do gooders so called freeloaders on our way off life

 

come to this country you abide by our laws our customs or piss off

 

rant over

 

thank you phil for posting that neil

 

 

[Bruce]

The whole Dien Bien Phu thing was history repeating itself. In Haiti, the first and only successful slave revolt took place against the French. The slaves expected the USA to support them and they had modeled their constitution on the US one. After all, the US had fought an anti-colonial war against the British and then a civil war against ( ostensibly) slavery.

 

Alas they were wrong about the US which insisted they pay the French for everything... this kept Haiti broke and it is an almost failed state to this day.